Hence, both gave the pre-eminence to political aims over military goals. Eastern military strategy and greatly influenced Chinese, Japanese, Korean and Vietnamese historical and modern war tactics. Military strategy is the books on military strategy and tactics pdf and execution of the contest between groups of armed adversaries. Strategy may be divided into ‘Grand Strategy’, geopolitical in scope and ‘military strategy’ that converts the geopolitical policy objectives into militarily achievable goals and campaigns.
Strategy is the art of distributing and applying military means, such as armed forces and supplies, to fulfil the ends of policy. Tactics means the dispositions for, and control of, military forces and techniques in actual fighting. Put more shortly: strategy is the art of the conduct of war, tactics the art of fighting. The view had prevailed since the Roman times, and the borderline between strategy and tactics at this time was blurred, and sometimes categorization of a decision is a matter of almost personal opinion. All deal with distance, time and force but strategy is large scale, can endure through years, and is societal while tactics are small scale and involve the disposition of fewer elements enduring hours to weeks. Originally strategy was understood to govern the prelude to a battle while tactics controlled its execution.
20th century, the distinction between maneuver and battle, strategy and tactics, expanded with the capacity of technology and transit. It is often said that the art of strategies defines the goals to achieve in a military campaign, while tactics defines the methods to achieve these goals. We’re going to do this by a naval invasion of the North of country X”, “We’re going to blockade the ports of country Y”, to a more specific “C Platoon will attack while D platoon provides fire cover”. In its purest form, strategy dealt solely with military issues.
In earlier societies, a king or political leader was often the same person as the military leader. If not, the distance of communication between the political and the military leader was small. But as the need of a professional army grew, the bounds between the politicians and the military came to be recognized. In many cases, it was decided that there was a need for a separation. War is too important a business to be left to soldiers. As the size and number of the armies grew and the technology to communicate and control improved, the difference between “military strategy” and “grand strategy” shrank.
Another element of grand strategy is the management of the post-war peace. As Clausewitz stated, a successful military strategy may be a means to an end, but it is not an end in itself. There are numerous examples in history where victory on the battlefield has not translated into long term peace, security or tranquility. Many military strategists have attempted to encapsulate a successful strategy in a set of principles.
According to Greene and Armstrong, some strategists assert adhering to the fundamental principles guarantees victory, while others claim war is unpredictable and the general must be flexible in formulating a strategy. Others argue predictability is low, but could be increased if experts were to perceive the situation from both sides in the conflict. These underlying principles of strategy have survived relatively unscathed as the technology of warfare has developed. A successful strategy from one era tends to remain in favor long after new developments in military weaponry and matériel have rendered it obsolete. Hannibal’s removal from Italy, despite never beating him there with their legions. One of these strategies was shown in the battle between Greek city states and Persia.
Greek forces were outnumbered stood as a good military strategy. The Greek allied forces ultimately lost the battle, but the training, use of armor, and location allowed them to defeat many Persian troops before losing. In the end, the Greek alliance lost the battle but not the war as a result of that strategy which continued on to the battle of Plataea. 479 BC resulted in a victory for the Greeks against Persia, which exemplified that military strategy was extremely beneficial to defeating a numerous enemy. Ingenuity and adeptness were limited only by imagination, accord, and technology. Strategists continually exploited ever-advancing technology.
Genghis’ successes, and those of his successors, were based on manoeuvre and terror. The main focus of Genghis’ strategic assault was the psychology of the opposing population. Moreover, since horse milk and horse blood were the staples of the Mongolian diet, Genghis’ horse-herds functioned not just as his means of movement but as his logistical sustainment. All other necessities would be foraged and plundered.
Khan’s marauders also brought with them mobile shelters, concubines, butchers, and cooks. Compared to the armies of Genghis, nearly all other armies were cumbersome and relatively static. It was not until well into the 20th century that any army was able to match the speed of deployment of Genghis’ armies. When confronted with a fortified city, the Mongol imperatives of maneuver and speed required that it be quickly subdued. Here the terror engendered by the bloody reputation of the Mongolians helped to intimidate and subdue.